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(To appear in annual returns—see rules inside).

N. 13(a).  
S.-A.

Serial No. 7

NOTE

ON

BLACK MOUNTAIN AFFAIRS

SUBSEQUENT TO THE

EXPEDITION OF 1891.

BY

CAPTAIN A. H. MASON, D.S.O., R.E.,

DEPUTY ASSISTANT QUARTER MASTER GENERAL, INTELLIGENCE BRANCH.



SIMLA:

PRINTED AT THE GOVERNMENT CENTRAL PRINTING OFFICE.

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## NOTE

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
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**CUSTODY AND DISPOSAL OF SECRET BOOKS, REPORTS, &c., ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE  
BRANCH, QUARTER MASTER GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT IN INDIA.**

The attention of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief having been called to the want of system in the custody, use, and disposal of secret works, &c., His Excellency desires that in future the following regulations may be strictly adhered to:—

- (a) Officials to whom works of a secret nature are issued will be held personally responsible for their safe custody, and they must be very careful to keep them under lock and key, and under no circumstances to leave them where they are likely to be observed by people who should have no access to them. They will submit annually (on the 1st January) to the Intelligence Branch a return showing that such matter is still in their possession.
- (b) When an official to whom a secret work has been issued vacates his appointment or is transferred or proceeds on duty or leave (out of India for any period, or in India for any period exceeding 3 months), all secret works in his possession, if held in his official capacity, must be personally made over to his successor (be he temporary or permanent), and a report submitted to the Intelligence Branch by the officer handing over the issues showing that this has been done. The following is the form of report to be made:—

Certified that I have this day delivered over to..... the following secret works issued to me by the Intelligence Branch:—

No.	Full title of work.	No. of volumes.	No. of copies.	REMARKS : Explaining reason of handing over.
<p><i>CANCELLED</i> <i>No 27 of 1892</i></p>				

*Place and date.*

*Signature.....*

*Signature of receiving officer.....*

In the case of officers of the District Staff, these reports must be sent through the G. O. C.

- (c) In the case of an official leaving his station under circumstances other than above stated, it is optional for him to hand over the secret works in his charge to another officer with the above prescribed formalities; but, if he does not do so, he is as responsible for them during his absence as he is during his presence at his station.
- (d) Personal or complimentary issues of secret works will be held by the recipient until his departure from India, when the secret matter will be returned to the Intelligence Branch for safe custody, or special permission obtained for its retention.

ARMY HEAD QUARTERS; }  
*Simla, 1st October 1891* }

JAMES BROWNE, *Major-General,*  
*Quarter Master General in India.*

NOTE  
ON  
BLACK MOUNTAIN AFFAIRS  
SUBSEQUENT TO THE  
EXPEDITION OF 1891.

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**Agreement with Isazai clans after expedition of 1891.**

At the end of May 1891, the Hassanzai and Akazai *jirgas* attended at General Elles's head-quarters at Seri, and they were followed by the Mada Khel, whom it was necessary to include in the settlement, because they with the Hassar-zai and Akazai clans together make up the Isazai tribe, of which Hashim Ali Khan was regarded as the nominal head.

The chief conditions which these three clans then bound themselves to observe were :—

- (1) The perpetual banishment of Hashim Ali Khan, Sikandar Khan his brother, Shekh Ata Muhammad his uncle, and Turabaz Khan, son of Shekh Ata Muhammad. If they or any of them came into their power, the clans undertook to arrest and make them or him over to the British Government.
- (2) Protection and preservation of roads made in their territory.
- (3) Obligation to accompany and escort officials marching on the border, and, on due notice being given, to escort and protect servants of Government travelling in their country.
- (4) Prohibition of any future settlement of the Hindustani fanatics within their limits.
- (5) Responsibility for offences by their clansmen in British territory; protection of British subjects in their country; and an undertaking to refer to the Deputy Commissioner all claims against British subjects, and not to seize such persons or their property in satisfaction of such claims in foreign territory.

The Hazara Field Force was broken up in June, but a brigade was left at Seri in the Hassanzai country and at Nimal on the crest of the Black Mountain until November in order to maintain quiet and ensure the banishment of Hashim Ali Khan. Meanwhile the three clans had formally elected as their Chief Ibrahim Khan, the rival and cousin of Hashim Ali Khan.

With a view to increase our control over the clans on this border, to assist in the maintenance of peace, and to secure the continued expulsion of Hashim Ali Khan, the levy of a small force of 200 Border Police, to be recruited from the independent clans and posted at suitable places on the frontier, was sanctioned.

The Swatis of Nandihar, Tikari, Deshi, and the Parari Saiads accepted service in this force freely enough. The Hassanzai and Akazai at first refused the offer of allowances and of service, but finally agreed in order to shorten the occupation of their hills by our troops. In April 1892 there were 43 Hassanzais and 28 Akazais in the force; but these clans had not so far shown themselves eager or ready to enlist.

Hashim Ali Khan, the refugee Chief of the Hassanzais, subsequent to the expedition of last year lived for the most part among the Makki Khel, a Chagarzai section on the confines of Buner. He, however, made incessant appeals to the clans around to aid him in an attack on Seri. The Nasrat Khel and Bassi Khel sections of the Chagarzai, who are nearest to us, steadily refused to join, but he still had many friends among his own people.

After the withdrawal of the troops in November last, a petty raid was made by some personal retainers and old servants of Hashim Ali, who carried off a few head of cattle from a solitary cowshed high up the Black Mountain just within the confines of Agror.

At the end of March Hashim Ali visited Baio, and later on some of the principal Mada Khel villages interviewed his supporters or sympathisers among the trans-Indus Hassanzais and Mada Khels, and induced them to agree to his family settling at Baio and Doba (see Skeleton Map at the end of this note. Baio is a Hassanzai and Doba a Mada Khel village). On the 8th April he brought his family to Baio escorted by a following of Makki Khel and Sundar Khel, sections of the trans-Indus Chagarzai, who live on

**Election of Ibrahim Khan as Chief of the Isazai clans.**

**Raising of a small force of Border Police sanctioned.**

**Unwillingness of Hassanzai and Akazai to enlist.**

**Account of Hashim Ali Khan subsequent to the expedition of 1891.**

**His return to the Hassanzai and Mada Khel country in April 1892.**

the slopes of the Duma range, and here his supporters built him a house.

An accident, which had no connection with Hashim Ali Khan, served to increase the excitement and add to his following. Shortly before this a quarrel occurred between two factions in Palosi, and the party which gained the ascendancy expelled the other from the mosque. Ibrahim Khan in the meanwhile had gone down to the river to hold a *jirga* of the cis-Indus sections to take steps against Hashim Ali's intended return. The defeated party in Palosi, finding him in the neighbourhood with a gathering, invited him over to turn the tables on their enemies. They in their turn sent for Hashim Ali Khan, who came down to Nawe Kili; but neither he nor Ibrahim Khan were strong enough to cross and try conclusions with the other. While the situation lasted, the excitement naturally increased. Hashim Ali Khan's allies brought a few flags, and some *mullas* began to collect, but in the end both sides were induced to retire simultaneously.

**And consequent breach of the agreement made by the Isazai clans.**

In allowing Hashim Ali to return to Baio, the Hassanzais and Mada Khels were guilty of a breach of the agreement to which they had subscribed at Seri on the 29th May 1891.

**Principal supporters of Hashim Ali Khan.**

The most active partisans of Hashim Ali Khan appear to have been the Kotwal Hassanzai of Nawe Kili, the Lughman Khel of Palosi, and the Mada Khel of Manjakot; but there can be no question that the other sections concurred, and that the whole of the sections tacitly consented, and were culpably negligent.

**Isazai clans warned.**

In consequence of their failure to keep their engagements, the Hassanzais and Akazais were warned that, if they were unable or unwilling to keep Hashim Ali out, we must occupy their territory. At the same time the Mada Khels were threatened with punishment if they did not withdraw all countenance and support from Hashim Ali Khan; and the Nawab of Amb was told that he would be held responsible if trouble arose which exertions on his part might prevent.

**Nawab of Amb reminded of his responsibility.**

These orders to the clans were notified to them in writing, and were repeated to the *jirgas* of the cis-Indus Hassanzais, Akazais, and Mada Khels when they came into Ughi on the 22nd and 23rd April.

**Culpability of Mada Khels.**

In the opinion of the Deputy Commissioner the Mada Khels were equally if not more guilty than the Hassanzais in allowing Hashim Ali to return, as the latter would

never have committed themselves had they not known the Mada Khels were with them. Hashim Ali Khan spent several days among the Mada Khels at Karor, at Manjakot, Sonia, and other villages, and was attended by many of their principal *maliks*.

To give substance to the threats made to the clans, a wing of the 2-5th Gurkhas was moved to Ughi on the 15th April, and on the 29th of the same month this wing was reinforced by the remaining wing of that regiment, together with the 1-5th Gurkhas and No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery.

As a result of the visit of the *jirgas* to Ughi above referred to, the tribes entered into a sworn compact among themselves to expel Hashim Ali Khan; but this apparently led to no result, and he himself continued to reside in Baio with his family, while his relatives were given an asylum in Doba, which is near Baio.

On the 6th June sanction was given by the Government of India to the blockade of the Mada Khels, the establishment of a police post at Darband, and to the Nawab of Amb being informed that, unless his influence with the Black Mountain tribes was exercised on the side of law and order, the question of his removal, temporarily or permanently, would have to be considered. The Government of India also authorised the Punjab Government to inform the three Isazai clans that unless Hashim Ali was surrendered to the British authorities, or expelled from their territory within one month from the receipt of the notice, which should be given to them under the orders of the Lieutenant-Governor, the British Government would order a force to advance across the border.\* In the meantime endeavours were to be made to bring about the surrender of Hashim Ali Khan, and with this object in view, if he or any one else on his behalf asked for terms, authority was given to offer a suitable allowance for his maintenance and that of his family in British territory.

On the 11th June the Deputy Commissioner, Hazara, reported that Hashim Ali, his brother, cousin, and whole family had cleared out of Baio, the three first named having gone to the Makki Khel Chagarzais, while their women and families had obtained an asylum among the Sundar Khels. He also reported that a *jirga* of the partisans of Hashim Ali Khan had sent word that they wished to come in and intercede for him. It does not appear from the papers received in this office that this deputation

**Troops moved to Ughi.**

**Sworn compact among tribes to expel Hashim Ali Khan.**

**Resulting in nothing.**

**Sanction given to a blockade of the Mada Khel and the establishment of a police post at Darband.**

**And also to the Isazai clans being threatened with the advance of a force into their country, unless Hashim Ali Khan was surrendered or expelled within one month.**

**Terms offered to Hashim Ali Khan in the event of his surrendering himself.**

**Departure of himself and his family from Baio.**

\* This notice does not appear to have been given to the tribes.



ever came in, but it seems from the correspondence that if they had done so, they would probably have demanded that Hashim Ali Khan should be allowed at once to return to Seri and be reinstated in his former position.

**Return of Hashim Ali to Baio.**

In the meanwhile Hashim Ali Khan returned to Baio.

Negotiations carried on first by Mr. F. D. Cunningham, C.I.E., the Deputy Commissioner, Hazara, and then by Captain E. de S. Smart, 5th Gurkhas, failed to bring him in, and he appears still to be in trans-Indus Hassanzai territory.

**Proposal of the Government of India to depute a special officer to carry on the negotiations.**

On the 4th August the Government of India addressed the Punjab Government regarding the future action to be taken with regard to affairs on the Black Mountain. The following is an extract from this letter :—

“ I am to observe that as the time is approaching when any expedition to be sent into the Isazai country this autumn will have to start, the Government of India think that if the local authorities should be unsuccessful in procuring Hashim Ali Khan's surrender before the end of August, a special officer might with advantage be sent to carry on the negotiations. It seems just possible that the deputation of such an officer, particularly if it were known that he was armed with special instructions from the Government of India, and that his arrival was likely to be followed in the course of a few days by that of a British force, might tend to bring about a successful issue.”

In reply to the above, the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, in a letter dated the 6th August, gave at some length the objections of the Lieutenant-Governor to the adoption of such a course, and His Honour recommended that if the Government of India after considering his views was still of opinion that a special officer would have a better chance of success than the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, such an officer should be appointed at once, as under the conditions laid down in the Government of India letter above quoted the chances of the civil authorities being successful in any further negotiations “ would be reduced to almost nothing.”

**Major-General Sir William Lockhart selected for the duty.**

The Government of India, having concurred in this view, informed the Punjab Government on the 13th August that His Excellency the Viceroy had been pleased to select for this duty Major-General Sir William Lockhart, K.C.B., C.S.I., commanding the Punjab Frontier Force.

On the 18th August this decision was communicated to Sir William Lockhart by the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, and that officer was requested to proceed as soon as possible to the Hazara border to take charge of the negotiations with the Isazai tribes.

The following instructions were given to General Lockhart for his guidance in the conduct of these negotiations :—

#### Government instructions

- (a) The three Isazai clans—Hassanzai, Akazai, and Mada Khel—are bound by the engagements they entered into last year to perpetually exclude and banish Hashim Ali and his family from their country, and to surrender them to the British Government, should they come into the power of the said clans. Hashim Ali is now at Baio within Isazai territory, and he has been in other Isazai villages. The clans have, therefore, broken their engagements. You are authorised to inform them that, unless Hashim Ali is surrendered to the British authorities within one month from the receipt of the notice which you should give them, they will be punished. You should, however, if possible, arrange to reassure Ibrahim Khan and the friendly section of the tribe as to your intentions towards them.
- (b) As regards Hashim Ali personally, the question is separate. You may promise him a suitable allowance for the maintenance of himself and his family in British territory, and you should consult the Punjab Government as to the amount of the allowance. If a question is raised as to how long Hashim Ali is likely to be detained in British territory, you should reply that the length of his detention is a matter absolutely in the discretion of the British Government, but that it will depend on the way he behaves himself, and on the state of the border during the next few years. You are also authorised to give a liberal reward, the amount of which is left to your discretion, to

any one who succeeds in inducing Hashim Ali to surrender, or who brings him alive within British jurisdiction.

(c) In all negotiations you should deal as a rule with the tribal *jirga*, but Hashim Ali must be distinctly informed through the *jirga*, or otherwise at your discretion, of the terms upon which his surrender will be accepted by the Government of India. Some evidence pointing to the possibility that Hashim Ali may be less unwilling to surrender to the military than to the civil authorities has been laid before the Government of India. As to this you will no doubt take care to avoid any action calculated to suggest to Hashim Ali the idea that he will obtain more just treatment or more favourable terms from the military than from the civil authorities. The Governor-General in Council is of opinion that if Hashim Ali should evince a disposition to surrender at one place in preference to another, or to one official in preference to another, be they soldiers or civilians, no obstacle should be thrown in his way.

(d) Your position in regard to correspondence with the Government of India will be the same as if you were in command of a force in the field; but you will understand that the object of the Government of India in deputing you to this duty is to exhaust every means at their disposal of effecting a peaceful solution before sanctioning further punitive measures.

Should the negotiations now entrusted to Sir William Lockhart fail, the steps necessary to carry out the punishment of the Isazai clans will have to be considered.

It may be observed, in conclusion, that the Akazais do not appear to have given any active support to Hashim Ali Khan in his recent proceedings; and, of the Isazai clans, the Mada Khels and the trans-Indus Hassanzais have been the most forward in the matter, and are therefore the most guilty.

A. H. M.

Simla,

22nd August 1892.

E. R. E.

